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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
This brief is filed on behalf of professors of education, education law and
educational measurement as amici curiae in support of Plaintiffs-Appellants
Kim Cook et al. 1 Amici have dedicated their careers to studying education,
educational testing, and/or education law. Regardless of their backgrounds,
all of amici have a commitment to valid, rigorous, and fair educational testing
and evaluation of student and teacher performance.
Amici have a significant interest in this case because the District Court’s
erroneous rulings below immunize from constitutional attack uses of public
teaching employee evaluation methods that are invalid, unreliable, and
completely lacking in scholarly support, and are patently arbitrary teacher
evaluation methods, which produce information that misleads, rather than
informs. If such methods were to bear a constitutional imprimatur—as they
would under the District Court’s ruling, then public teaching employees
nationwide would have their livelihoods, their careers, indeed their callings
threatened by purely arbitrary decisions, clothed with a false veneer of
rationality. As teachers and scholars of education law and educational

A full list of the Amici appear in the Appendix to this brief. The names of
educational institutions are provided for identification purposes only.
1
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measurement, amici strongly believe that such arbitrary decision making
should not be viewed as constitutionally permissible in public educational
institutions, and they collectively urge the court to consider the scholarly
consensus in the academic community, that these methods—used as they are
under the challenged policies in this case—are invalid, unreliable, and
arbitrary means of making high-stakes decisions.
Amici were unable to obtain consent from two of Defendants-Appellees
for the filing of this brief, so amici have submitted with this brief a motion for
leave of this Court to file as amici curiae. See Fed. R. App. 29(a)-(b); 11th Cir.
R. 29-1.
No party’s counsel authored this brief in whole or in part. No party or
party’s counsel contributed money that was intended to fund preparing or
submitting this brief. No person—other than the amici curiae or their
counsel—contributed money that was intended to fund preparing or
submitting the brief. See Fed. R. App. P. 29(c)(5).

-2-

ISSUE PRESENTED
Did the District Court err in holding that there was a rational basis for
three public school districts to adopt policies, and for state officials to approve
such policies, requiring teacher evaluations for the majority of teachers to be
based on the test scores of students or in subjects the evaluated teachers did
not and do not teach, where such policies subvert the purposes of test-based
teacher evaluation and completely lack scholarly support?

-3-

INTRODUCTION AND
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This case involves a challenge to the use of “value-added modeling” in
three Florida school districts to judge the performance of teachers who had no
meaningful opportunity to influence the test scores on which that
performance judgment was based. Amici are professors of education,
education law, and educational measurement in several institutions of higher
learning across the United States who are intimately familiar with valueadded modeling, its uses, and its problems. Amici believe that the evaluation
systems challenged in this case are patently irrational. However, because
these systems are also quite complex and are best understood in light of their
historical context and current purposes, amici submit this brief in the hopes of
assisting the Court in understanding just how preposterous the evaluation
systems challenged here are. Amici urge this Court to reject as
unconstitutional an educational employee evaluation system adopted by the
Defendants-Appellees that has absolutely no scholarly support or rational
justification whatsoever, and that flatly contradicts the state’s avowed
purpose in evaluating its teachers based on student growth.
Based on recent statutory enactments, Florida’s school districts are now
required to evaluate their teaching employees using a technique called “value-4-

added modeling.” Value-added modeling describes a statistical technique that
researchers and evaluators use to attempt to isolate the effect that an
independent variable (in Florida’s system as designed, the teaching
performance of the teacher being evaluated in teaching the tested curriculum)
has on a dependent variable (in Florida’s system as designed, the achievement
of that teacher’s own students on the test of the curriculum taught), while
controlling for other factors (called “covariates”) that might also be affecting
the dependent variable. There are many ways in which one might construct a
value-added model in evaluating teaching performance, but they all share the
same goal—isolating the effect of one teacher on the learning gains of that
teacher’s own students in the subject the teacher teaches, and controlling for
other causes of such learning gains, such as income, race, family
circumstances, prior achievement levels, and school characteristics.
Even when used to evaluate teachers based on the performance of their
own students on standardized tests of the curriculum that the evaluated
teachers actually teach, value-added modeling is problematic and
controversial, but it can be defended, and has garnered some acceptance in
the scholarly literature, despite its known flaws. However, this case deals
with an entirely different use of value-added modeling altogether. The school
district Defendant-Appellees in this case, with the approval of the state official
-5-

Defendants-Appellees, used a value-added model based on the scores of one
teacher’s students in one curricular subject to evaluate teachers who either do
not teach those students at all, or do not teach them the subject on which they
are tested. This use conflicts with the central purpose of value-added
modeling because it isolates the effects of one teacher—the teacher who
taught the tested students the tested curriculum—and uses that effect to
judge the performance of a completely different teacher. This use of valueadded modeling also has no scholarly support whatsoever. In fact, it is so
irrational a concept to use the scores of one teacher’s students, or a test of one
teacher’s subject, to judge the performance of another teacher of entirely
different students and/or subjects that the scholarly literature does not even
contain any studies examining such use.
The district court below erred in holding that the state and district
defendants “could rationally believe” that evaluating teachers using the test
scores of students they have not taught, and/or in subjects they do not teach,
would further an ostensible state interest in improving student achievement.
In fact, the opposite is true. It is clear to amici as experts on educational
testing that this use of value-added modeling undermines rather than
supports Florida’s important educational accountability objectives because it
holds one teacher responsible for the work of another teacher, meaning that
-6-

there is nothing the evaluated teacher can do to improve her evaluation score
by improving her own teaching. Even to the layperson, it would appear
arbitrary and irresponsible to evaluate one employee based on the work of
another employee over which the evaluated employee has no supervisory
control or authority. Such arbitrary official decision making should not be
part of our public employment apparatus, especially in our schools, where it is
so important to determine accurately whether teachers are teaching well.
Accordingly, amici respectfully urge reversal of the District Court’s ruling.
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ARGUMENT
I.

EVEN WHEN USED CORRECTLY AS DESIGNED, VALUE-ADDED
MODELING IS A CONTROVERSIAL METHOD FOR EVALUATING
TEACHERS, PLAGUED BY CONCERNS OVER VALIDITY AND
RELIABILITY.
Value-added modeling describes a group of highly complex statistical

techniques that researchers and evaluators use to attempt to isolate the
influence of an independent variable on the positive and negative changes in a
dependent variable—in other words, to determine the “value” that the
independent variable “adds” to the dependent variable. When used for
evaluating teachers, the independent variable is the performance of the
teacher in the classroom, and the dependent variable is the achievement of
the evaluated teacher’s students, typically as reflected in their scores on
standardized tests.
Value-added models such as the Florida model that is the subject of this
case use the prior performance of students on several years of standardized
tests, along with other factors, to compute an expected learning gain that each
student should be able to accomplish from one testing year to the next.

-8-

(Florida Value-Added Technical Report, Dkt. 86-2,2 Exh. C, at 2-3) (hereinafter,
“Fla. Tech. Rep.”). Then, for each student, the model computes the currentyear test score that would be predicted based on one or more prior years of
test scores together with additional student and school characteristics, and
compares the current–year test score actually obtained to that prediction to
determine whether the actual score was higher or lower than what the model
predicted it would be. If it is higher, then the teacher who taught the tested
subject to that student will be viewed as having “added” positive “value” to the
student’s achievement as compared to an average teacher, once other factors
are controlled for. If it is lower, then the teacher will be viewed as having
“added” negative “value.” Once all of these scores are computed, they are
combined with each other and with another measure that reflects the
characteristics of the school in which the teacher teaches, and this ultimately
results in the teacher being assigned a value-added rating. (Fla. Tech. Rep. at
4-6.) Under Florida law, this value-added rating generally must constitute at
Amici are mindful of 11th Circuit Rule 28-5 and its requirement that briefs
contain citations to the Record on Appeal by volume, if available. At the time
of the filing of this brief and its accompanying Motion for Leave to File, the
record excerpts have not yet been submitted to the Court. Accordingly, amici
cite the record as reflected in the District Court’s docket entries (“Dkt.”). If the
Court so wishes and directs, amici will convert the record citations herein to
the desired format and file a substitute brief once the record is available.
2

-9-

least 50% of the teacher’s annual performance evaluation score that
determines whether the teacher will be retained, dismissed, tenured, etc. (Fla.
Stat. § 1012.34(3)(a)(1); see also Expert Report of Edward H. Haertel, Dkt. 8613, ¶ 11) (hereinafter, “Haertel Rep.”).
The use of standardized test scores to evaluate teaching performance
has always been controversial. Critics have objected to it for many reasons,
among them that standardized tests often measure only a narrow portion of
what we hope students learn in school, and that they generally do so using the
least expensive means—usually machine-scored multiple-choice questions,
when other methods, such as essay or performance assessment, would be
better aligned with the essential knowledge and skills we hope students will
acquire in school. (Haertel Rep. ¶ 53.)
These problems, however, pale in comparison to the unfairness that
results when student scores on standardized tests are directly imputed to
schools and teachers as measures of educational quality, without controlling
for other factors that might cause differences in these scores.3 The

See, e.g., W. James Popham, Why Standardized Tests Don't Measure
Educational Quality, 56 EDUC. LEADERSHIP 8, 8-15 (1999) (outlining this
inherent flaw in using standardized tests as measures of educational quality
without controlling for other factors).
3
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measurement scholarship has established that only between one and 14
percent of the variation in student test scores can be explained by the
effectiveness of the teacher who taught the tested students in the tested
subject.4 This means that anywhere from 86% to 99% of the variation in
student test scores is the result of factors other than the quality of the teacher.
Obviously, then, it would be the height of unfairness to judge teaching
performance based on the test scores of a teacher’s students without
controlling for all of those other causal factors.
Value-added modeling was initially conceived as a way of addressing
this problem by statistically controlling for measured factors other than
teaching performance, such as student prior performance, language ability,
socioeconomic status, race, and school characteristics, and thereby isolating
the performance of a specific teacher as the cause of an identified learning
gain. (See Haertel Rep. ¶ 8). Nevertheless, its use is controversial due to
concerns over its validity and reliability.
“Validity” is a measurement term referring to the appropriateness of
the inferences one seeks to draw, or the actions one seeks to take, based on
AMERICAN STATISTICAL ASSOCIATION, ASA STATEMENT ON USING VALUE-ADDED
MODELS FOR EDUCATIONAL ASSESSMENT (April 8, 2014), available at
https://www.amstat.org/policy/pdfs/ASA_VAM_Statement.pdf .
4
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the scores that a measurement yields. For example, even the best and most
carefully calibrated weight scale will provide a poor—or invalid—measure of
height. To measure height, one needs a tool that is a valid measure of height,
such as a ruler. Providing valid estimates of teachers’ effectiveness is very
complex, for two reasons. First, the goals of education are numerous and
complex. Second, there are many other factors that influence student
performance, some of which have very strong influence. The second of these
is particularly important to the present case. When many factors in addition
to the construct the evaluator is interested in affect a variable, the factors
other than the construct need to be “controlled.”
The isolation of teaching performance is theorized to be a good way to
ensure the validity of the use of student test scores to judge teaching
performance because it is accomplished through controlling for measurable
factors other than teaching that contribute to student achievement. In
practice, the Florida value-added model pursues such isolation of teaching
performance as a causal factor by first controlling for many other plausible
factors that may influence the FCAT scores of the tested students—namely,
each student’s prior test scores; the number of courses in the tested subject
that each student takes; each student’s disabilities (if any); each student’s
ability to speak and read English; whether each student is gifted; each
-12-

student’s attendance record; the mobility of each student from school to
school during the school year; the tendency of students to be promoted to the
next grade after one year; the size of the class each student is in for the tested
subject; and the existing differences, or variance, in test scores among the
students in the tested class. (Fla. Tech. Rep., pp. 3-4).
Once the model controls for these factors, a large portion of the variance
in FCAT scores, and therefore a large portion of the gains or losses in
achievement among the teacher’s students, will have been accounted for by
the controlled non-teaching factors. The residual portion of the student
learning gains not accounted for by these factors is then assumed to be caused
by the teaching performance of the teacher who taught the tested students in
the tested subject. (Fla. Tech. Rep., pp. 6-7). In other words, even when used
as designed, the Florida value-added model does not arrive at a direct
conclusion that a particular teacher’s performance caused a portion of student
learning gains. Rather, it assumes this conclusion based on the existence of a
residual student gain not accounted for by the controlled non-teaching factors.
Id.
Such an assumption depends heavily on the further assumption that all
relevant non-teaching factors have been adequately accounted for in the
model, but some outside factors are impossible to control in any statistical
-13-

model of this type. (Haertel Rep. ¶ 23). For example, scholars have identified
“peer effects”—the increases and decreases in learning growth that a student
experiences by being placed in classes with strong or weak students—as a
factor that value-added modeling has trouble controlling for.5 Additionally, in
Florida, because the value-added model compares the scores of students at
the end of one academic year to the scores of those same students at the end
of another academic year, it cannot control for learning losses that occur over
the summer. The scholarship establishes that students in lower
socioeconomic categories suffer more learning loss than those in higher
socioeconomic categories. (Haertel Rep. ¶ 25). In the absence of an adequate
control for summer learning loss, then, a teacher of reading or math will be
held responsible for such loss, even though she lacks any ability to prevent it
because she will not even meet the tested students in question until after the
learning loss happens. In short, there is a significant concern that, even when
used as designed, value-added models may be measuring the influence of
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, GETTING VALUE OUT OF VALUE-ADDED: REPORT OF A
WORKSHOP, H. Braun, , N. Chudowsky, & J. Koenig, (Eds.) (Washington, D.C.: The
National Academies Press 2010)., available at
http://216.78.200.159/Documents/RandD/Other/Getting%20Value%20out
%20of%20ValueAdded.pdfhttp://216.78.200.159/Documents/RandD/Other/Getting%20Valu
e%20out%20of%20Value-Added.pdf
5
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factors confounded with the factor they attempt to isolate—teacher
effectiveness. In measurement terms, value-added models such as the one
used by Florida therefore may not be “valid” measures of teaching quality.
Aside from concerns over validity, which can be minimized (though
never eliminated) through careful model design and implementation, another
pressing problem that the scholarship has identified with value-added models
is their very low “reliability.” (Haertel Rep. ¶ 44.) Reliability is a
measurement term used to describe the consistency of a test in measuring the
same construct from one administration to the next. For example, though a
weight scale is obviously a valid measure of weight, for the scale to be a
reliable measure of weight, it must read “10 pounds” when a 10-pound
bowling ball is placed on it, and it must do so every time the bowling ball is
placed on it. If it reads “10 pounds” the first time, and then “4 pounds” the
second time for the same object, then the scale is not a reliable measure of
weight.
In measurement scholarship, reliability is measured using a coefficient,
the value of which can range from zero to one. A value of one indicates perfect
reliability—a scale that reads “10 pounds” every time the 10-pound bowling
ball is placed on it. A score of zero indicates no reliability—a scale that might

-15-

read literally any value each time the same 10-pound bowling ball is placed on
it.
Scholarship has established that the reliability of value-added model
scores from year to year ranges between .2 to .4—or very low reliability.6 By
way of comparison, well-known standardized tests such as the SAT and the
ACT typically have reliability coefficients on the order of .8 to .9.7 To better
understand how weak these coefficients are, the authors of one study divided
the teachers evaluated into quintiles and tracked the stability of their ratings
placement from quintile to quintile over two years. They found that teachers
who scored in the top quintile one year were just as likely to find themselves
in one of the bottom two quintiles the next year as they were to find
themselves in the top quintile again.8 Such large changes in ratings from year

See D. F. McCaffrey, T. R. Sass, J. R. Lockwood, & K. Mihaly, The Intertemporal
Variability of Teacher Effect Estimates, 4 EDUC. FIN. & POL’Y, 572, 572–606
(2009).
7 See, e.g., ACT, INC., THE ACT TECHNICAL MANUAL (2007), at 59, t. 4.13, available
at http://www.act.org/aap/pdf/ACT_Technical_Manual.pdf (last visited Sept.
10, 2014); see also THE COLLEGE BOARD, TEST CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SAT:
RELIABILITY, DIFFICULTY LEVELS, COMPLETION RATES (2013), available at
http://media.collegeboard.com/digitalServices/pdf/research/TestCharacteristics-of-SAT-2013.pdf (last visited Sept. 10, 2014).
8
McCaffrey et al., supra note 6, at 572-606.
6
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to year indicate that the value-added model studied (a precursor to Florida’s
current model) was very imprecise.
Despite these flaws, it is accepted by a portion of the scholarly
community that, when meticulously constructed and used as designed, a
value-added model can provide enough useful information over time to justify
using model-derived ratings as one element of the overall evaluation of a
teacher. Important to this acceptance, however, is the assumption that such a
model will be designed to isolate the influence of the teaching performance of
the teacher who teaches the tested students in the tested subject. Amici do
not take a position here on that use of the Florida value-added model—the use
for which it was designed. As amici explain further below, however, the uses
to which Florida’s value-added model has been put in this case are
fundamentally different from these intended uses, in that they violate the
central assumptions underlying value-added evaluation, they completely lack
scholarly support or rational justification, and they directly undermine
Florida’s ostensible goal in using value-added modeling in teacher evaluation.

-17-

II.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE
EVALUATION METHODS USED BY THE DEFENDANTS WERE
RATIONALLY RELATED TO ANY LEGITIMATE STATE INTEREST IN
IMPROVING STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT.
The district court entered judgment for both the State Defendants-

Appellees (hereinafter, the “State”) and the District Defendants-Appellees
(hereinafter, the “Districts”), based on two separate Orders, the first
dismissing claims challenging the Florida statute that requires the use of
student growth scores as a major portion of each teacher’s evaluation (Dkt.
111), and the second awarding summary judgment to the DefendantsAppellees on the claims challenging the District policies implementing the
statute by evaluating the Plaintiffs-Appellants based on the work of other
teachers (Dkt. 112). Both of these Orders held that the decision makers for
each Defendant-Appellee “could rationally believe” that the use of valueadded ratings computed from the test scores of one teacher’s students to
assign a performance rating to another teacher who did not teach those
students, and/or did not teach the tested subject, furthered a state interest in
“improving student achievement.” These decisions were erroneous for
several reasons. The remainder of this Brief explains three of those reasons:
(1) the challenged uses directly contradict the purpose of using value-added
modeling; (2) the challenged uses lack any support in the scholarship or any
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rational justification; and (3) the challenged uses undermine Florida’s
ostensible goals in using employee evaluation ratings based on student test
scores to improve student achievement.
A. The use of value-added modeling scores derived from testing of
students and/or subjects the Appellant teachers do not teach
directly contradicts the methodological justification for using
value-added modeling.
As introduced above, value-added modeling attempts to address the
many objections to the use of standardized test scores to judge educational
quality by isolating the effect of one teacher on the standardized test scores of
that teacher’s students, in the subject that teacher teaches, while controlling for
the influence of other factors on such scores. Florida’s model takes its student
test scores from the annually administered Florida Comprehensive
Achievement Test (“FCAT”), which tests reading in grades 3-10, and math in
grades 3-8. The assumption of the value-added model used in Florida is that,
once all of the non-teaching factors are controlled for, all of the remaining
nonrandom variation in student achievement on the FCAT is attributable to
the efficacy of the student’s teacher with respect to the tested curriculum.
Florida adds to this attribution a portion of the students’ score variation that
can be attributed to school factors other than teaching, in a laudable effort to
account for overall differences between schools. (Fla. Tech. Rep., pp. 4-6.) So,
-19-

the Florida model’s design requires (1) accounting for all measurable and
measured factors that might explain student performance other than the
performance of the student’s teacher in the tested curriculum; (2) assuming
that any variation not explained by those non-teaching factors was caused by
the student’s teacher in the tested curriculum; and then (3) computing a
rating for that teacher based on that residual portion of student score gains,
adjusted for overall student achievement in the teacher’s school.
The District Court divided the Appellant teachers into two groups, based
on the circumstances that caused them to object to the use of these computed
scores to judge their teaching. What the District Court termed “Type B”
teachers are those who taught students who took the FCAT, but who did not
teach any FCAT-tested curriculum to those students—for example, a sixthgrade science teacher. What the District Court termed “Type C” teachers are
those who taught in grades in which no students take the FCAT (kindergarten
through second grade, as well as eleventh and twelfth grade), or in third
grade, the year students take only the baseline (first administration) test,
thereby making the computation of any “student growth score” impossible.
(Order Granting Summ. Judg. to Def., Dkt. 112, pp. 4-5).
The Districts computed value-added ratings for the Type B teachers
based on the reading and/or math FCAT scores of the students whom the
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Type B teachers taught non-tested curricula, such as music or science.
(Haertel Rep. ¶ 16.) For the Type C teachers, even this was not possible, so
the Districts assigned each of these teachers a value-added rating made up
entirely of the portion of the variance in test scores attributable to nonteaching factors at the teachers’ schools. (Haertel Rep. ¶ 15).9 Indeed,
Defendant-Appellee Alachua County Schools even evaluated the teachers of
one elementary school that contained only grades kindergarten through
second (Irby) using the test scores of the fifth-grade students of a completely
different elementary school (Alachua) (Pl. Motion for Summ. J., Dkt. 86, p. 2).
It should be readily apparent that these uses are completely antithetical
to the methodological purpose of value-added modeling—to isolate the effect
of one teacher on the performance of that teacher’s students in the subject that
teacher teaches. As to the Type B teachers, assigning a value-added rating to a
teacher who did not teach the curriculum tested, while also attributing that
same residual variation in student scores after controlling for non-teaching

As Dr. Haertel, the Appellants’ expert, explains, in two of the Districts, the
score was actually a combination of the school portion and the average of the
teacher portion for all of the teachers in the school, but since the teachers’
value-added scores would have naturally roughly balanced each other out, the
scores in these Districts were actually nearly entirely a reflection of the school
portion. (Haertel ¶ 15, n.2).
9
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factors to the teacher who actually did teach the tested curriculum, makes the
value-added rating of the Type B teacher entirely dependent on the
performance of the teacher of the tested curriculum. In effect, the model
isolates the teaching performance of one teacher and attributes the
responsibility for it to another teacher—a use that could not be more at odds
with the model’s design.
As to the Type C teachers, the use of the portion of student score
variance explained by non-teaching school factors takes a covariate designed
to control for school characteristics, and to thereby make the individual
teacher ratings more accurate and valid by adjusting for between-school
differences, and uses it as the sole determinant of whether a Type C teacher is
performing well. In other words, even though the central purpose of using a
value-added model to evaluate teaching employees is to isolate the influence
of one teacher’s performance on her student’s achievement, the ratings of the
Type C teachers isolate precisely nothing at the teacher level. Type C teachers
are rated based on the overall performance of students in the school who take
the FCAT. No attempt is made to isolate any influence that the Type C teacher
(or indeed any other teacher) had on that performance. Rather than
separating effective from ineffective teachers, the model as applied to Type C
teachers rates every single teacher in the same school who does not teach
-22-

FCAT-tested students or subjects as equally effective or ineffective. The ratings
of the Type C teachers therefore are completely at odds with the state’s goals
in adopting value-added modeling of improving student achievement by
enhancing the quality of teaching based on meaningful and relevant
information about teaching performance.
B. The use of value-added modeling scores derived from testing of
students and/or subjects the Appellant teachers do not teach
has absolutely no scholarly support.
Measurement scholarship has established that between one and
fourteen percent of a student’s standardized test score gains can be attributed
to the effectiveness of the student’s teacher in the tested subject based on
value-added modeling.10 However, no scholarship whatsoever has established
that any portion of a student’s test score performance can be explained by the
teaching performance of teachers who do not teach that student, or who do
not teach the tested curriculum.
This lack of scholarly support is not surprising. The uses to which the
Districts have put Florida’s value-added model are directly in conflict with the
purpose of value-added modeling, which is to isolate the classroom
AMERICAN STATISTICAL ASSOCIATION, ASA STATEMENT ON USING VALUE-ADDED
MODELS FOR EDUCATIONAL ASSESSMENT (April 8, 2014), available at
https://www.amstat.org/policy/pdfs/ASA_VAM_Statement.pdf .
10
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effectiveness of one teacher as the cause of an identified student learning gain.
In fact, the idea that anything other than a trivially miniscule portion of a
student’s performance in the tested curriculum could be explained by the
performance of teachers who do not teach that curriculum or that student is
so ludicrous that the scholarly community has not even examined it. (Haertel
Rep. ¶ 57.)
One need not be an expert to understand why there is a complete lack of
any scholarship even hinting at examining the hypothesis. Scholars do not
study these methods for the same reason they do not evaluate whether to
award a diploma to one student based on another student’s standardized test
scores—it is facially preposterous and patently irrational to even consider
doing so. Likewise, it is preposterous to believe that one teacher can or
should be held accountable for the growth or lack thereof in test scores of
students they do not teach, or on tests given to assess a curriculum they do
not teach and for which they do not claim any expertise. No rational school
district would voluntarily adopt such a system, no rational parents would
choose to have their children’s teachers evaluated in this manner, and no
rational teacher would choose to be evaluated in this way.
The State and the Districts simply pulled these methods out of thin air,
with no justification for them from any source. When pressed during
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deposition testimony, even the State’s own witness could not come up with a
rationale for these methods, and witnesses for the three school district
defendants each affirmatively agreed that the use of these methods weakens
their teacher evaluation systems. (Pl. Motion for Summ. J., Dkt. 86, p. 5.). The
District Court’s hypothesizing that the State and the Districts “could rationally
believe” that using scores in this way would further student achievement is
therefore belied by the facts and should be rejected by this Court on that basis
alone.
C. The use of value-added modeling scores derived from testing of
students and/or subjects the Appellant teachers do not teach
works against the State’s ostensible goal of “improving student
achievement” because it holds teachers accountable for student
achievement results that the teachers cannot influence.
The State’s ostensible goal in adopting value-added modeling as the
basis for teacher evaluation statewide is “improving student achievement.”
However, the State’s goal of “improving student achievement” is meaningless
in the context of value-added assessment unless the assumption underlying it
is that, when teachers receive lower value-added scores, they will respond to
those scores by taking action to improve their practices, thereby improving
student achievement and increasing their own value-added ratings. But
basing the value-added score for the Appellants on the performance of
students they either do not teach at all or to whom they do not teach the
-25-

tested curriculum bases the score entirely on matters that are outside the
control or influence of the teacher. There is no rational basis for any state or
district official to have believed that incentivizing teachers to somehow
improve scores over which their own teaching practices have no influence
would improve student achievement.
Under the State’s value-added model, all of the residual score variation
left over after the non-teaching factors are accounted for is attributed to the
student’s teacher in the tested subject, meaning that none of this residual
variation is attributable to any other cause, including the performance of
another teacher. Similarly, the school’s overall score is not connected to any
particular teacher, but is the State’s way of calibrating overall student
achievement levels in the school in the tested subjects and controlling for it to
account for the differences between schools. If the State’s goal is indeed
improving student achievement, then there is literally nothing the Appellants
can do purposely to improve their own teaching in response to their valueadded ratings to serve that goal because neither the Type B ratings nor the
Type C ratings contain any useful information about the Appellants’ own
teaching performance.
To illustrate, under the uses of the value-added model adopted by the
Districts and approved by the State, if an ineffective Type B teacher is lucky
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enough to share students with an exemplary reading teacher, for example, that
Type B teacher will be judged to be an excellent performer based on that
exemplary reading teacher’s own good performance, despite the Type B
teacher’s ineffective teaching in his or her own subject. Conversely, if a highly
effective Type B teacher is unlucky enough to share students with a
particularly poor reading teacher, the Type B teacher will be judged to be a
substandard teacher, despite the fact of the Type B teacher’s own excellent
teaching performance. The only thing that the first Type B teacher can do in
response to such an unfair, misleading, and arbitrary rating of her
performance is to work the back channels of her school administration to
make sure that she does not share any students with the poor reading teacher
the next year. This outcome manifestly does not serve the purpose of
improving student achievement. In fact, since it incentivizes not better
teaching but administrative gamesmanship, it works against that purpose.
Similarly to the Type B teachers, the Type C teachers, who are rated
based on the overall performance of their schools, cannot control or change
the characteristics of the schools into which they are assigned, and they
cannot do anything to influence, for example, the quality of the principal’s
leadership, the school’s faculty-student ratio, or the average years of
experience of the teachers with whom they teach—all non-teaching factors
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that are plausibly part of the overall school score. So, if for example a Type C
teacher who is an exemplary classroom teacher is recruited to a struggling
school to teach disadvantaged students, and she does a terrific job with her
own students but does not teach any FCAT-tested grade levels, she will
nevertheless be rated as a poor teacher if the FCAT scores of the students she
does not teach fall short of their predicted growth. The only thing that such a
teacher can do in response to such an unfair, misleading, and arbitrary way of
rating her teaching performance is to secure an assignment to a more
advantaged school. Once again, since it incentivizes administrative
gamesmanship rather than better teaching, this outcome is manifestly at odds
with the ostensible state goal of improving achievement for all students
irrespective of their circumstances.
The District Court’s opinions elided these obvious problems and judged
to be “rational” a completely fanciful and ludicrous theory of causation that is
squarely at odds with both the purpose of value-added modeling and the
evidence in the record. Under the District Court’s reasoning, if the teacher
evaluation systems in the Districts were instead based on increases and
decreases in sales of healthy food in the school lunchroom (either to the
teacher’s own students or to the student body as a whole), then it would be
“rational” to hire, fire, tenure, deny tenure to, or otherwise discipline the
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teachers based on those sales because it is conceivable that one could believe
that all teachers in a school should be promoting healthy lifestyles, and that
the healthier a student’s eating choices are, the more likely that student will
be ready, willing, and able to learn—thereby improving student achievement.
Obviously, using such a method for rating teachers would be ridiculous, but
the Type B and Type C teachers have no more control over the teaching of
their colleagues in other grades and/or subjects than they do over the sales
abilities of the cafeteria staff.
The law of this Circuit also dictates reversal in this case. See Debra P. v.
Turlington, 644 F. 2d 397, 404-406 (5th Cir. 1981).11 The Court in Turlington
established the proposition that, when states and school districts make highstakes decisions based on standardized tests, those tests must be fair, and the
uses to which they are put must be valid. See id. (remanding for a showing
that what was tested on a high school exit examination was actually taught in
Florida’s high schools). That principle requires reversal here. Using a method
to evaluate the Appellants that bears no relation to the work that they actually
do, and that depends entirely on teaching behaviors of other teachers whom
Decisions of the Fifth Circuit prior to October 1, 1981 are binding precedent
in the Eleventh Circuit. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th
Cir. 1981).
11
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the Appellants have no opportunity to control, is just as arbitrary and
irrational as denying diplomas to students based on their test performance
where the test covers material they never had the opportunity to learn. See id.
Simply put, holding people accountable for results they cannot meaningfully
influence or control is patently arbitrary and irrational, and when used in a
public school district to make high-stakes decisions, it violates the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, amici curiae respectfully join the PlaintiffsAppellants in requesting that this Court reverse the judgments below
dismissing the claims challenging the Florida statute that gave rise to these
evaluation policies, and granting summary judgment in favor of the School
District Defendants on the claims challenging their policies implementing the
statute in ways not only contrary to the statute’s overall purposes but also
devoid of scholarly warrant or rational justification.
If rational basis review is to mean anything at all, it must not permit
public school evaluation policies which undermine the very goals they are
adopted to pursue, particularly where there is not the slightest hint of
scholarly support or rational justification for such policies. Accordingly, amici
respectfully urge reversal of the District Court’s ruling, along with some
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